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Access to Higher Education and Inequality:  The Chinese Experiment 
 
Abstract 
We apply a semi-parametric latent variable model to estimate selection and sorting 
effects on the evolution of private returns to schooling for college graduates during 
China’s reform between 1988 and 2002. We find that there were substantial sorting gains 
under the traditional system, but they have decreased drastically and are negligible in the 
most recent data. We take this as evidence of growing influence of private financial 
constraints on decisions to attend college as tuition costs have risen and the relative 
importance of government subsidies has declined. The main policy implication of our 
results is that labor and education reform without concomitant capital market reform and 
government support for the financially disadvantaged exacerbates increases in inequality 
inherent in elimination of the traditional “wage-grid.”  
Keywords: Return to schooling, selection bias, sorting gains, heterogeneity, financial 
constraints, comparative advantage, China 
JEL Codes: J31, J24, O15   3
I. Introduction and Background 
 
Two salient features of the labor force in centrally planned economies were the 
wage-grid and the nomenklatura. The wage-grid system compressed wage differentials 
across education groups, while the nomenklatura system selected who attended college to 
acquire knowledge and training to function in the planning bureaucracy. The private 
economic return to higher education in terms of earnings tended to be very low. China, 
since 1978, the former Soviet Union and its satellites, since approximately 1990, have 
given up central planning and entered a period of transition to market systems. During 
transition, wage-grids have been relaxed or removed, and wage differentials have 
increasingly reflected market outcomes; educational attainment, especially at higher 
levels, has become subject to conscientious choices made by each individual; 
conventionally estimated returns to education have risen to levels comparable to those 
observed in developed countries. However, transition toward free markets has occurred at 
different speeds across the formerly planned economies, and wage differential trajectories 
have varied widely.
1              
Among the major transitional economies, China has taken the most gradual course 
toward market reform. From the inception of economic reform into the early 1990s, wage 
differences by level of skill, occupation, and/or schooling remained very narrow.  The 
Mincerian return to higher education was even lower than in the early years of the Mao 
era (i.e. 1950s; see Fleisher and Wang 2005).  Since the early 1990s, there is evidence 
that returns to schooling in China have begun to increase (Zhang and Zhao, 2002; Li, 
2003; Yang, 2005). Although the rising return to schooling most likely has contributed to 
growing income inequality,
2 a major concern addressed here, however, is that growing 
inequality has been exacerbated by in increased difficulty for many families to access 
                                                 
 
1 There is a growing literature on returns to education and wage differentials experienced in these 
transitional economies. See Brainerd (1998) on Russia; Munich, Svejnar and Terrell (2005) on the Czech 
Republic; Orazem and Vodopivec (1995) on Slovenia; and Jones and Ilayperuma (2005) on Bulgaria. 
Fleisher, Sabirianova and Wang (2005) provide a comparative study of eleven former centrally planned 
economies including Russia and China.  
2 Yang (2005) shows that the dispersion of returns to schooling across Chinese cities increased sharply 
between 1988 and 1995. Wang et al (2007) provide most recent evidence of rising income inequality from 
1987 to 2002 in China.   4
educational opportunities. Evidence that this concern is well founded is vividly presented 
by Hannum and Wang (2006).  Using 2000 Census data, they show that the percent of 
variation in years of schooling explained by birth province increased significantly during 
our sample period. According to Yang (1999, 2002), China in the late 1990s surpassed 
almost all countries in the world for which data are available in rising income inequality.   
  The end of the Mao era saw the influence of political considerations on access to 
higher education sharply diminish, and college admission criteria reverted to historical 
practice which placed a very heavy weight on merit as determined by critical tests in 
senior high schools. More recently, however, a growing proportion of college students 
have had to fund their own educational expenses (Hannum and Wang, 2006; Heckman, 
2004), forcing them to forego college due to financial constraints.
3  By 1997, tuition 
became mandatory in all colleges in China, and the average tuition reached about 31% of 
per capita GDP.  This ratio rose to 46% in 2002, roughly the same level as for private 
colleges and universities in the US (Li 2009). Between 1992 and 2003, the government 
share in total education expenditures in China decreased from 84% to 62%, and the share 
of tuition and fees increased from about 5% to approximately 18% (China Statistical 
Yearbook 2005).  The proportion of the population privileged to attend college has been 
and remains very small by almost any standard, despite a sharp acceleration of schooling 
expenditures and expansion of enrolment in the past decade (Fleisher and Wang, 2005; 
Heckman, 2005), 0.6% in 1982, 1.4% in 1990, 2.0% in 1995, 4.1% in 2001, and 6.2% in 
2006, according to various issues of China Statistical Yearbook.  
  Access to college and concomitant economic gain depends not only on current 
financial resources, but also on the ability to achieve high test scores and on cognitive 
and other attributes produced in earlier family and educational contexts.  Thus, higher 
educational attainment depends recursively on earlier access to publicly and privately 
supported education at lower levels as well as on the capacity to borrow funds to pay 
direct and indirect college costs (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Hannum and Wang, 
2006). If access to all levels of schooling is available only to the financially, politically, 
                                                 
 
3 Until the early 1990s, college education was almost free in China. The government paid for tuition and 
lodging, while students only needed to pay for meals and books.  Tuition at major Chinese Universities 
now approaches US$1,000 per year or more (People’s Daily, 2000).   5
and geographically advantaged, the bulk of China’s population will be excluded from full 
participation in the growth of human capital and the income it produces.  
  In this paper we focus on the changes in returns to college education during the 
course of economic transition in China from 1988 to 2002. Unlike most traditional 
literature on this topic that assumes homogenous returns, we apply a semi-parametric 
estimator, assuming that returns are heterogeneous returns and that individuals respond to 
anticipated returns.  We pay particular attention to sorting, selection, and cohort-specific 
treatment effects and their changes over time as China marketizes its higher education 
system.  We address the following questions. 
1.  How do the estimation results based on heterogeneous returns assumption 
differ from those obtained with traditional OLS and IV methods? 
2.  How have the determinants of the probability of college attendance changed?   
3.  Have the gains, or potential gains, from choosing college narrowed or 
widened? Are the changes caused by self-selection based on comparative 
advantage or by involuntary selection?  
4.  Is there evidence that financial constraints have reduced the effectiveness of 
higher education in China?  
Our major contribution is to estimate both the levels of and changes in the returns 
to a four-year college education over a critical time period of China’s transition toward 
free markets.  But “free to choose” implies “required to pay” as well.  Is the transition to 
the need for students and their families to finance an increasing proportion of the cost of 
higher education matched by an equally rapid change in provisions for the financially 
constrained? The literature has largely ignored the impact of lagging capital market 
reform on individual investment in human capital. In this paper, we shed some light on 
the effects of this lack of coordination in reform.  
We exploit three cross-sectional data sets, collected in 1988, 1995, and 2002.
4 Our 
three sample years represent three distinct stages of China’s transition from tuition-free 
college with some living allowances through the1989 beginnings of the transition away 
from “free” college education to mandatory tuition in all colleges. Our data allow us to 
                                                 
 
4 These are not panel data sets.    6
investigate the impact of these fundamental institutional changes. By 2002, this transition 
was well advanced. Throughout this period and especially after 1998, higher education 
capacity expanded rapidly. Universities increased enrollment substantially, and the 
government initiated a number of policies to foster world-class universities in China.
5  
The large body of literature on returns to education abounds with studies that 
assume homogenous returns. Following Griliches (1977), a great deal of effort has been 
devoted to correcting bias caused by unobserved ability and measurement error (Card 
1999). However, the instrumental variables (IV) method suggested to correct bias in the 
estimators breaks down when returns are heterogeneous. Another strand of research 
follows the work pioneered by Roy (1951), Willis and Rosen (1979), and Willis (1986). 
These scholars assume that schooling decisions are conscientious choices by rational 
forward-looking individuals who act on their anticipated heterogeneous returns to 
education. Under these conditions, the appropriate procedure is to estimate a latent 
variable model with correlated random coefficients.  
We use methods developed in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000) that combine 
the treatment effect literature (Bjorklund and Moffitt, 1987) with the latent variable 
literature. Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000) and Caneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil 
(2000) explain why conventional approaches fail to estimate meaningful policy 
parameters when agents act on anticipated heterogeneous returns. Suppose the return to 
schooling β is randomly distributed across the population as shown in Figure 1. Ignoring 
the heterogeneity and uncertainty in the costs of attaining education, let β1 be the current 
breakeven return. That is, only those agents whose return to education is greater than β1 
will find it worthwhile to attend school. There are several interesting policy parameters in 
this framework, but it is unclear which one the conventional instrumental variable 
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5 See Li (2009) NBER working paper for a review of higher education in China.   7






β β β ∫ — the average return of those whose schooling decisions are 
reversed due to the tuition hike, which in general doesn’t agree with any of the three 
parameters described above.
6 That is, the conventional instrumental variable method 
doesn’t recover appropriate policy parameters because the subset of returns of those who 
reverse decisions due to the instruments is not representative of the schooled, the 
unschooled, or the population as reflected in the entire hypothetical distribution of returns 
depicted in Figure 1.  
In this paper we estimate cohort-specific parameters that answer well-posed 
policy questions under the assumption of heterogeneous returns:  (i)  Average return to 
college, i.e. the average treatment effect, which measures the return to a randomly 
selected individual in the sample; (ii) the treatment on the treated effect, which measures 
the return to those who actually attend college; and (iii) the treatment on the untreated 
effect, which  estimates the potential (counterfactual) gain a high-school graduate could 
earn had he/she attended college. These estimates reveal important information for 
individuals’ schooling choice and for government’s education policies. For instance, such 
information can help design government assistance to the financially disadvantaged to 
attend college, or for government policy to expand enrollment so that higher education 
becomes more accessible.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the theoretical 
framework and derives the parameters enumerated above. Section III briefly discusses the 
data. Empirical results are reported and analyzed in section IV. Section V draws 
conclusion. 
 
                                                 
 
6 The same also applies to other popular instrumental variables used in the literature such as compulsory 
schooling and distance to nearest schools, etc.   8
II. Methodology 
 
Our method takes into account both heterogeneous returns to schooling and self-
selection based on anticipated returns. We set up the following model of earnings 

















where a subscript indicates whether the individual is in the schooled state (S=1) or the 
unschooled state (S=0).
7 Y is a measure of earnings, and X is observed heterogeneity that 
might explain earnings differences. U1 and U0 are unobserved heterogeneities in earnings 
determination, and E(U0)=E(U1)=0. The vector X includes work experience, work 
experience squared, gender, ethnicity, and occupational characteristics. In general, the 
functional forms can have a nonlinear component, and U1≠U0.    
Each individual can choose only one of the above two states. The schooling 
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* is a latent variable whose value is determined by an observed component μs(Z) 
and an unobserved component Us. A rational individual will attend college (i.e. S=1) only 
if this latent variable is nonnegative. In our empirical work, the vector Z may share some 
variables with vector X, but Z must also contain variables not in X for the model to be 
identified.  In the vector Z we include parental education, parental income, number of 
                                                 
 
7 Throughout this paper the schooled state is attending college, while the unschooled state is not attending 
college after graduating from high school. Sometimes the college state is also referred to as the treated 
state, while high-school graduates are sometimes referred to as the untreated state. We only consider 
individuals who at least have graduated from high school.   9
siblings, gender, ethnicity, and birth year dummies. Variables included in Z but not in X 
serve as instruments to identify the returns to education, and these instruments are applied 
locally so that they identify each region in the distribution of the marginal treatment 
effects (discussed below).
8 Equations (1) and (2) are correlated not only because X and Z 
usually share components, but also because the schooling decision at least partially 
depends on anticipated returns implied in the potential earnings equations and thus the 
unobservables are also correlated.    
  In estimating the schooling choice model, we use both parental income and 
parental education to control for ability formation and for possible financial constraints. 
Research on human resources is abundant with evidence that children from well-educated 
parents are more likely to go to college (e.g. Ashenfelter and Zimmerman, 1997). Higher 
parental income not only mitigates short-run financial constraints, it also predicts long-
term ability-enhancing benefits due to better earlier education, better nutrition, and better 
environments that foster cognitive and non-cognitive skills in children.  
  From equations (1), we define a heterogeneous return to education,  
 
    () () () () 10 1 0 1 0 ln ln YY X XU U βμ μ =−= − + −    (3) 
 
Therefore β is a random variable correlated with U0 and U1. Pooling the schooled and 
unschooled together,  
 
  () ( ) 10 0 0 0 ln ln 1 ln ln YS Y SY Y S X S U βμ β =+ − = + = + + . (4) 
 
Equations (3) and (4) reveal the problems in conventional OLS estimation. More 
specifically, Heckman and Li (2004) shows
9 
 
                                                 
 
8 The conventional global instrument method (see Figure 1) only identifies the mean return of the subset of 
people whose decisions are reversed by the instrument. However this subset does not in general represent 
the treated, the untreated, or the population. By applying an instrument locally, we circumvent the 
“representativeness” issue by identifying a limiting version of the return, i.e. the marginal treatment effect. 
9 We suppress the conditioning of X here and below in order to simplify exposition.   10
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The first term is the average treatment effect (ATE), i.e. the rate of return to education for 
a randomly selected individual. The second term in the square bracket is the OLS bias 
because schooling choice depends on the anticipated potential return, and the bias can be 
either positive or negative. Therefore, OLS in general doesn’t estimate the average 
treatment effect consistently. From the perspective of individuals who choose college, the 
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From the perspective of the unschooled group, the decomposition of the OLS bias is: 
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The term in the square bracket in (6) is selection bias for college students.  It is the mean 
difference in unobservables between the counterfactual of what a college graduate would 
earn if he didn’t attend college and what an average high school graduate earns.  The next 
term is sorting gain, which is the mean gain in the unobservables for college graduates, 
i.e. the counterfactual difference between what an average college graduate earns and 
what he would earn if the college degree were not obtained.  In Equation (7), the 
bracketed term is the selection bias for the unschooled group, which is the mean 
difference in unobservables between the counterfactual of what a high school graduate 
would earn had he completed college and what an average college graduate earns.  The 
second term is the sorting gain for this group, which is the mean difference in 
unobservables for high school graduates, i.e. the difference between what an average high   11
school graduate earns and the counterfactual of what would be earned had he completed 
college.
10  
Willis and Rosen (1979) show that selection biases can be either positive or 
negative.  When they are both negative, it is consistent with selecting by comparative 
advantage. On the other hand, positive selection bias in equation (6) and negative 
selection bias in equation (7) would be consistent with a single-factor (hierarchical) 
interpretation of ability, i.e. the schooled group on average has higher ability than the 
unschooled group.
11 It is particularly interesting to note that a positive selection bias for 
the unschooled group signals possible involuntary selection, meaning that the unschooled 
group would be better off if they had gone to college, but may be restrained from 
selecting their preferred alternative by unobserved barriers to college. 
Combine the above two types of sorting gains with the average treatment effect, 
we obtain two parameters that are of great policy interest: 
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The first equation defines the treatment on the treated effect (TT), and it can be 
decomposed into the sum of the average treatment effect and the sorting gain for the 
schooled group. The second equation defines the treatment on the untreated effect (TUT), 
which is the average treatment effect minus the sorting gain for the unschooled group. 
The treatment on the treated effect captures the mean gain the schooled group experience, 
compared with what they would earn if they hadn’t gone to college. The treatment on the 
untreated effect captures the mean gain the unschooled group would experience if they 
had gone to college, compared with what they earn now. If the sorting gain for the 
                                                 
 
10 Selection bias compares two groups of persons, the schooled and unschooled, while sorting gain 
compares two distinct earnings results of the same group. Therefore, the above decompositions by group 
allow us to extract more information from the data than conventional methods. 
11 For example, if the labor market is dominated by selecting by comparative advantages, then the best 
lawyers (i.e. schooled or college graduates) are also the worst plumbers (i.e. unschooled or high school 
graduates), and vice versa.  Under the hierarchical ability assumption, however, typical college graduates 
would be more productive lawyers and plumbers than typical high school graduates.   12
schooled group is positive, it is evidence of purposive sorting based on heterogeneous 
returns to education.  
Selection bias can be obtained from the following alternative decomposition of 
the OLS estimator: 
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Tautologically, the selection bias for the schooled group is the difference between the 
OLS estimate and treatment on the treated effect, while the selection bias for the 
unschooled group is the difference between the treatment on the untreated effect and the 
OLS estimate.  
  Following Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2000), we adopt a two-step 
procedure to estimate the above parameters. In the first step, a probit model is used to 
estimate the μs(Z) function of equation (2). The predicted value is called the propensity 
score,  ˆ
i P , where the subscript i denotes each individual. The second step adopts a semi-
parametric procedure in which local polynomial regressions are used to retrieve the 
marginal treatment effect. The marginal treatment effect is the marginal gain to schooling 
of a person just indifferent between taking schooling or not. The marginal treatment 
effect and parameters derived from it are estimated using the local instrumental variable 
method developed in Heckman, Ichimura, Todd, and Smith (1998). We do not impose 
any functional restrictions on the relation between marginal treatment effect and 
unobservables in the schooling choice equation.  Fan (1992, 1993) develops the 
distribution theory for the local polynomial estimator of E(Φ|Ξ=ξ), where (Φ,Ξ) is a 
bivariate random data set. It is shown that E(Φ|Ξ=ξ) and its first derivative can be 
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where N is the sample size. Then, γ1 is a consistent estimator of E(Φ|Ξ=ξ), and γ2 is a 
consistent estimator of ∂ E(Φ|Ξ=ξ) /∂Ξ.  G(.) is a kernel function and aN is a bandwidth. 
We use a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 0.2 in the empirical estimation.
12 
Intuitively, this algorithm is equivalent to applying weighted least squares at designated 
point, i.e. Ξ=ξ, using all observations but with decaying weights assigned to more distant 
data points. 
  More specifically, we estimate a partially linear, conditional expectation model of 
equation (3) 
  ( ) () () () () 10 1 0 |, |, ss E XU p X X EU U XU p βμ μ == − + − =   (3') 
By definition the left-hand-side is the marginal treatment effect at Us=μs. We assume 
linear functional forms for the first term on the right-hand-side of equation (3'), while we 
estimate the second term, i.e. E(U1-U0|X,Us=p) in a nonparametric manner.  Following 
the convention in the literature of semi-parametric estimation (Ichimura and Todd 2004), 
we first obtain consistent estimates of the linear coefficients with the double residual 
regression, and then retrieve the residuals for the nonparametric estimation. Specifically, 
we first estimate E(lnY|P=p) and E(X|P=p) with the local polynomial algorithm (i.e. 
equation (10)). Then we run the double residual regression of lnY-E(lnY|P=p) on X-
E(X|P=p).
13 This is a simple OLS regression that yields consistent estimates of 
coefficients of the linear components of equation (1).
14  Let α be the vector of these 
estimates.
15 Define the nonlinear component residual as U=lnY- αX. Use local 
polynomial regression again to estimate E(U|P=p) and its first derivative. This first 
derivative by definition is the marginal treatment effect.   
The average treatment effect (ATE) is a simple integration (over the support of 
μs) of the MTE with equal weight assigned to each Us=μs. Furthermore, treatment on the 
                                                 
 
12 This approximates the rule-of-thumb bandwidth selector proposed in Fan and Gilbels (1996). 
13 This procedure is analogous to de-meaning the earnings equations. This approximately purges out the 
nonlinear components due to the continuity of the nonlinear functions, which allows us to retrieve the 
nonlinear components later by using the residuals.  
14 We use evenly spaced points from the joint set (with increment equal to 0.01).  
15 Since we pool both the schooled and unschooled groups in this step, we essentially assume the linear 
components between the two equations in (1) only differ by a constant, which is the average treatment 
effect. This assumption dramatically simplifies the computation, and it can be easily modified by running 
separate double residual regression for each group and obtain different α for each group.       14
treated (TT) and treatment on the untreated (TUT) are simple integration of MTE with 
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where f(p) is the conditional density of propensity scores. The conditioning on X is 
implicit in the above functions. All integrations are calculated numerically using simple 
trapezoidal rules.  
Intuitively, since we are interested in the marginal individuals whose unobserved 
heterogeneity of attending college is μs, a propensity score that is close to μs provides 
more information than one that is farther away from μs. Thus, the observations whose 
propensity scores are closer to μs dominate the estimates. Moreover, since we are 
interested in the change in logarithm of income, i.e. return to schooling, due to an 
infinitesimal change in μs, the first derivative estimator γ2 in equation (10) consistently 
estimates the marginal treatment effect.
17    
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data used in this study are from the first, second, and third waves of the 
Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) conducted in 1989 (CHIP-88), 1996 (CHIP-
95), and 2003 (CHIP-2002).
18  Each wave of the CHIP consists of an urban survey and a 
                                                 
 
16 For derivations of these weighting functions, see Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000). The TT weight is 
basically the scaled probability of receiving a propensity score that is greater than μs, i.e. being treated. On 
the other hand, the TUT weight is the scaled probability of receiving a propensity score that is smaller than 
μs, i.e. not being treated.   
17 In practice we also include a quadratic term in equation (10) to improve the accuracy of estimation.  
18 The CHIP-88 and CHIP-95 data are available to the public at the Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR). Both data sets have been used intensively by researchers around the   15
rural survey; we only use the urban survey data for this study.  Each urban survey covers 
thousands of households and individuals in about a dozen provinces.   
The three sample years represent distinct phases of economic reform in China.  
Specifically, 1988 represents the early stage of urban reform that started in 1982 and 
ended with the 1989 Tian-An-Men Square demonstration.  The year 1995 represents the 
middle stage of urban economic transitions after the reform re-started in 1992 and before 
the 1997-98 Asian financial crises, and by 2002 economic transition had entered a mature 
stage.  One measure of progress in economic transition is the share of employment in the 
non-public sector which, as shown in tables 2a, 2b and 2c, increased from 1% in 1988 to 
9% in 1995 and then rapidly to 36% in 2002.      
Because we are interested in self-selection based on heterogeneous returns, we 
must assure that individuals in our sample had a reasonable chance of exercising a choice 
to attend college. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) virtually eliminated the choice to 
attend college. Many youths were sent to the countryside for “rectification” (or “re-
education”), and many colleges and even middle schools were either closed or 
dysfunctional.  In 1977, the government reinstated the college entrance exams after a ten-
year hiatus.  After 1978, all high school graduates who could achieve high enough grades 
and entrance examination scores could attend college (see Li 2009).  As a general rule in 
the late 1970s, children started elementary school at age 7 and stayed for 5 years; junior 
high school and senior high school each took 2 years.  Thus, an individual who was born 
in 1962 and started elementary school at age 7 would be a senior in high school in 1978 
and could choose to take the required examinations and go to college if he/she performed 
sufficiently well.  Thus we limit our samples to individuals born in 1962 or after.  
Our samples are further restricted to working individuals who are living in a 
household with their parents and who have positive earnings in the survey year. In 
addition, the sample is limited by the availability of family background information such 
as parental education and income. As specified above, the samples consist of two 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
world.  For details about CHIP-88 and CHIP-95, see Griffin and Zhao (1993) and Riskin, Zhao and Li 
(2001).  CHIP-02 has not yet been released to the public.  A recent publication using CHIP-02 is Khan and 
Riskin (2005).    16
education groups: 3 or 4-year college graduates and high school graduates.
19  Variable 
definitions and sample statistics are presented in tables 1, 2a, 2b, and 2c.
20  The 
proportion of college graduates in the samples was 19% in 1988, 49% in 1995, and 61% 
in 2002.
21   
We define earnings to include regular wages, bonuses, overtime wages, in-kind 
wages, and other income from the work unit.  The hourly wage rate is calculated as 
earnings divided by reported hours worked. The nominal average hourly wage almost 
doubled from 2.30 yuan in 1995 to 4.57 yuan in 2002 (with negligible inflation), and the 
increase was larger for college graduates than for high school graduates.
22 The standard 
deviation of wage rates also doubled. We use parental income five years prior to the 
survey date as one of the proxies for potential financial constraints on attending college, 
because this is the closest match we can get to parental income at the time when the 
individual decided to go to college or not.
23   
      
IV. Empirical Results 
 
We first examine the probability of acquiring a college education, and then we 
analyze estimates of various treatment effects. 
A. Propensity to Acquire a College Education 
  Table 3a presents simple probit estimates of college attendance and the mean 
marginal propensities (probabilities) attributable to each independent variable in the three 
                                                 
 
19 The education measure includes several degree categories: elementary school or below, junior high, 
senior high, technical school, junior college (3-year college), and college/university or above.  For more 
details, see Li (2003).  Because technical school is different from senior high school and college, we 
excluded it from our samples.  Thus, our samples focus on high school graduates and college graduates.   
20 The sample of 1988 is the largest because we cannot distinguish children and children-in-law in a 
household. This may cause some problems of mis-matching parents’ education and income in the 
estimation.  Yet, this problem should not be very serious for 1988 because the oldest age should be 26 years 
old, still somewhat too young to be married.  In CHIP-95 and CHIP-02, the data can distinguish children 
and children-in-law.   
21 Note these proportions are calculated conditional on high school graduates and with the urban samples. 
Therefore they are significantly higher than those calculated using nationwide population survey.  
22 The nominal exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Chinese yuan depreciated sharply during our 
sample period. It was 3.7 yuan/dollar in 1988, 8.4 in 1995, and 8.3 in 2002. 
23 Such information is not available in CHIP-88, so current parental income is used instead.    17
sample years, 1988, 1995, and 2002, respectively. The regressors include those related to 
the budget constraint.  In particular, parental income provides the financial resources to 
attend college.
24 Since individuals in the sample are currently employed, the time they 
chose to enter college is at least four years prior to the date of the survey.  In CHIP-95 
and CHIP-02, we have information on parental income up to five years prior to the 
survey date, and we use parental income five years before the survey as a proxy for any 
financial constraint affecting college attainment.  We also include the number of siblings 
in the household as a proxy for a financial constraint, as children are likely to compete for 
financial resources to fund education.
25 
Parental education is included as it may be related to ability formation, attitude 
toward college, and information possessed about going to college, because (i) parental 
educational achievement is likely to reflect parental ability, which may be inherited by 
offspring; (ii) parental education is likely to contribute to child-rearing practices that 
foster pre-college “ability” attainment and to foster a generally positive attitude toward 
higher education (Carneiro, Meghir, and Parey, 2007).  We cannot rule out, though, that 
the financial ability to provide childhood investments in learning and nutrition may affect 
measured ability at older ages (Heckman and Li, 2004).  
We include a birth year dummy to capture year-specific factors related to 
opportunities of going to college, such as admission quotas administered by the Chinese 
Government Ministry of Education. This has been an effective cap on admissions, and 
from 1977 to 1999 the admission rate rose from less than 10% to 48% (Li, 2009). Other 
controls include dummy variables for gender dummy and for the ethnic minority. 
In all three years, both parental income and education exert a positive impact on 
children’s chances of attending college, and in most cases the estimates are statistically 
significant. This result implies that parental income and education play distinct roles in 
children’s education attainment despite their high correlation.  In all three years, father’s 
                                                 
 
24 College students generally do not have jobs in China. 
25 Unfortunately, it is an imperfect measure of household size, as not all children lived in the household 
during the time of survey.     18
education has a larger effect than that of mother’s.  The largest difference is found in 
1988, but the difference becomes much smaller and negligible in 1995 and 2002.
26   
Mother’s income shows a much larger effect on college choice than that of 
father’s in 1988 and 1995, but not in 2002.  The marginal effect of mother’s income is 
about four times larger than that of father’s in 1988 and two times larger in 1995.  The 
convergence of the marginal effects of father’s and mother’s income is consistent with  
parental income’s having more strongly reflected ability than financial constraints in the 
earlier period, when  tuition was not charged for most colleges and family financial 
resource wasn’t a barrier to college attendance. We postulate that, given father’s income, 
higher mother’s income supported better nutrition that contributed to ability formation in 
children. However, when ability to pay became a significant barrier to college attendance 
and nutritional problems due to inadequate diet diminished with general economic 
growth, the impact of mother’s income approached that of the father’s at the margin.  
We can use the estimated marginal effects to evaluate the relative impacts of the 
variables that influence schooling choice. For example, in 1995, the marginal impact of 
an additional year of father’s education has the same impact as an increase of 5.7 
thousand yuan of father’s income.  However, an additional year of father’s education is 
only “worth” 2.6 thousand yuan in 2002, implying a rise in the importance of parental 
income relative to parental education. We attribute this change to tuition hikes during the 
1990s. The pattern is not as pronounced for mother’s income, though.  
The estimated effect of another proxy for family financial constraint — the 
number of children in the household — is large, negative, and statistically significant in 
1988.  One more sibling reduces the probability of attending college by 4.5%. In 1995 the 
impact is still a negative 3.7% (and almost statistically significant the 10% level), while 
in 2002 the impact becomes insignificant.  Although this decline in the marginal impact 
of an additional child would appear to contradict our hypothesis that the influence of 
financial constraints on college attendance increased over time, we believe that it is due 
to increasingly stringent enforcement of the one-child policy which substantially reduced 
variation in the number of children among urban households.  Ethnic minority status does 
                                                 
 
26 The results for 1988 should be interpreted with caution because of possible mismatch of parental 
education and income.    19
not appear to be very important in college choice either, although it became quite 
negative and almost significant at the 10% level in 2002.   
Although it may at first appear surprising that in 1995 and 2002, the coefficient 
on the gender (male) dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, we 
interpret this higher likelihood for females to attend college as the result of selectivity 
prior to high-school attendance.  In all three samples, female students comprise a smaller 
proportion of high-school graduates than male students.  For female students, enrolling in 
high school signals strong commitment to attempting college; female students who have 
completed senior high school are more likely to continue into college.           
  In table 3a we compare marginal coefficients across years using sample means for 
each year.  In table 3b we perform the same exercise using the overall sample means, i.e. 
the three-year average.  In order to anchor the birth year dummy, we choose the cohort 
born in 1968 which appears in all three samples,
27 and we deflate nominal parental 
income by the urban CPI.  Table 3b shows that, for one thousand yuan increase in the real 
value of father’s income, the probability of going to college increases by 0.5 percentage 
point in1988 and 4 percentage points in 2002.  In 2002, the effect of father’s income 
surpasses education and becomes the dominant factor in college entrance. The impact of 
mother’s income also increases, but by a smaller amount. The growing importance of 
father’s income for college entrance, controlling for parental education, is consistent with 
the rising impact of higher college costs. The marginal effect of parental education 
increased sharply from 1988 to 1995, and then declined moderately in 2002.  An 
additional year of father’s education increased the probability of going to college by 1 
percentage point in 1988, 3.4 percentage points in 1995, and 2.4 percentage points in 
2002.  The effect of mother’s education displays the same pattern but the drop between 
1995 and 2002 is smaller. 
   The probit models generate a propensity score for each observation, which is the 
predicted probability of college attendance.  The frequency distributions of these 
propensities provide a reduced-form picture of growing college attendance in China 
                                                 
 
27  For 1988, those born in 1968 or before were combined into the same cohort.    20
(Figure 2).
28  For each year the left panel shows the distribution for all observations (S=1 
and S=0), while the right panel shows separate distributions for college graduates and 
high school graduates. The rightward shift of the combined distributions reflects 
increasing college enrollment and is consistent with the nearly 80% growth of the 
proportion of the urban population with at least a college education between 1988 and 
1995 and more than 100% growth by 1999, as documented in our data and in other 
studies as well (for example, Zhang and Zhao 2002, table 4).  In 1988, the frequency 
distribution of high school graduates is supported over a range of propensity scores from 
approximately zero through nearly 0.6;
29 in 1995, it is supported over the range from 
approximately zero through 0.9, and by 2002, it is supported over almost the entire range 
of propensities approaching 1.0.  The frequency distribution of college graduates is 
supported over the range of propensities between approximately zero and 0.7 in 1988, 
approximately zero and greater than 0.9 in 1995, and from about 0.1 through 1.0 in 2002. 
  Examining these distributions more carefully reveals some interesting trends.  
Table 4 shows that in 1988, 19.2% of the sample were college graduates and had a 
propensity score equal to or greater than 0.323. We define the cut-off propensity as the 
propensity score corresponding to the cumulative frequency of the total sample that had 
graduated from college in the sample year.  If there were no unobserved heterogeneity in 
returns to schooling, and if there were no financial constraints on college attendance, then 
the frequency distributions of propensity scores of college attenders and non-attenders 
would not overlap.   In 1988 10.5% of the entire sample had scores higher than the cutoff 
score and yet did not go to college; by construction the same fraction of the entire sample 
had scores lower than this value, yet they did attend college.  This ratio becomes 15.9% 
in 1995 and 15.3% in 2002.  Moreover, the percentage of such “misfits” in the 
unschooled group has increased from 12.9% in 1988, to 27.2% in 1995 and 39.7% in 
2002, while in the schooled group this percentage has decreased from 54.6% in 1988, to 
38.3% in 1988 and 24.9% in 2002.  
                                                 
 
28 The sample densities are smoothed with Gaussian kernels with optimal bandwidths defined in Silverman 
(1986). 
29 A small support implies that omitted factors play important roles or large unobservable heterogeneity 
exists in schooling decision.   21
These patterns suggest that unobserved heterogeneity increased dramatically over 
our sample period, mostly between 1988 and 1995, and such increased heterogeneity is 
apparently affecting the unschooled group more than the schooled group. The increased 
heterogeneity could reflect (1) a growing proportion of agents with high propensity 
scores who cannot realize their high potential because they are unable to finance college 
education; or (2) a growing importance of unobserved comparative advantage.  If (1) 
dominates, then we should observe selection bias and sorting gain diminishing over time 
for the schooled, and increasing over time for the unschooled; however, if (2) dominates, 
sorting gains for both groups should increase.    
  
B. College Education and Earnings 
  Table 5 contains the results of OLS, IV, and semi-parametric local instrumental 
estimation of the effect of college attendance on earnings.  For each sample we present 
two specifications of the earnings equation. The benchmark specification includes both 
parental income and education, and the comparison specification only uses parental 
income. The OLS estimates are similar to those reported elsewhere for comparable time 
periods, and exhibit an upward trend in private returns to college education.
30 The IV 
estimates of the return to college education (all of which use the propensity score as the 
instrument for college attendance) are smaller than the OLS estimates in 1988 but 
become considerably higher than the OLS estimates in 2002. Since in general neither 
OLS nor the conventional IV method consistently estimates the average treatment effect, 
such differences between OLS and IV do not have clear implications (Caneiro, Heckman, 
and Vytlacil, 2000).
31 In fact, both OLS and IV underestimate the ATE in the benchmark 
specification in all three samples, and the OLS bias increased from a negligible -1.5% in 
1988, to -13.5% in 1995 and -72.9% in 2002 (significant at 1%).  
  We now turn to our estimates of returns to schooling based on the semi-
parametric local IV estimation. Variables included in the choice equation but excluded 
                                                 
 
30 See Fleisher and Wang (2004) and Li (2003) for estimates and a summary of other studies for the same 
period. 
31 In the literature of homogenous return, IV estimates are usually found to be higher than the OLS 
estimates after correcting for omitted ability bias. The explanation is attenuation bias caused by 
measurement errors (Li and Luo 2004, Butcher and Case 1994, and Ashenfelter and Zimmerman 1997).     22
from the earnings equation de facto serve as instruments.  In the benchmark model the 
number of siblings and birth year are instruments for ability, while in the comparison 
model parental education is an additional instrument. Such choice of instruments has a 
long pedigree in the literature (e.g. Mare 1980) and is similar to that of Heckman, Urzua, 
and Vytlacil (2006) and Heckman and Li (2004).
32 The results from both specifications 
are generally consistent and robust.  
Based on the semi-parametric estimation, we find that between 1988 and 2002 the 
average treatment effect — the return to education for a randomly selected individual — 
has increased substantially. In the benchmark specification, the cumulative rate of return 
for four years of college has increased from an insignificant 24.4% in 1988,
33 to a 
insignificant 42.0%  in 1995, and then to a very significant 165.1%  in 2002.
34 However, 
when this dramatic change is decomposed into treatment on the treated (TT) and 
treatment on the untreated (TUT), we obtain strikingly contrasting results. The 
component of returns, TT, the realized return that is achieved by individuals who actually 
completed four years of college, changed from 105.6% in 1988, to 48.6% in 1995, and to 
175.1% in 2002.
35 This return compares the actual earnings of college graduates with the 
counterfactual earnings that they would have received as high-school graduates. TUT, 
representing the unrealized counterfactual return that could have been earned as college 
graduates by those who did not go to college, changed from 10.4% to 37.4%, and then to 
149.7%. The increase in the unrealized return outpaces that of the realized return. This 
implies that although the return to those who go to college has increased drastically since 
1988, the potential return for those who do not (or cannot) go to college has increased 
even more.  
We obtain further insights by analyzing the changes in selection bias and sorting 
gain for the schooled and unschooled groups over time.  For those who go to college, the 
                                                 
 
32 Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) uses number of siblings and mother’s graduation status as 
instruments; while Heckman and Li (2004) uses birth year and parental education as instruments. 
33 24.4% is computed with the formula 100[exp(0.218)-1) where 0.218 is taken directly from the 
corresponding entry in Table 5. All estimates discussed in this paragraph are transformed this way. 
34 These are four-year accumulative rates. The corresponding annualized rates are 5.6%, 9.2%, and 27.6% 
respectively.  
35 In a few cases, the result for 1995 does not follow the trend between 1988 and 2002. One reason is that 
for 1988, the wage measure is based on annual labor income; while for 1995 and 2002, the wage measure is 
based on hourly wage. Thus, the results for 1995 and 2002 are generally more comparable.   23
selection bias, the mean difference in unobservables between the counterfactual of what a 
college graduate would earn if he didn’t attend college and what an average high school 
graduate earns, became more negative (-0.517, -0.180, and -0.766, respectively).  That is, 
those who go to college are increasingly drawn from a pool who would have been below-
average earners among high-school graduates. Negative selection bias is evidence of self-
selection based on comparative advantage, and the negative trend in this variable implies 
that the degree of this self-section among college graduates has increased.  The sorting 
gain for college graduates, the counterfactual difference between what an average college 
graduate earns and what he/she would earn if had not gone to the college, is small and has 
diminished from 0.502 in 1988 to 0.037 in 2002.   
For those who do not go to college, the selection bias, the mean difference in 
unobservables between the counterfactual of what a high school graduate would earn had 
he completed college and what an average college graduate earns has changed from 
negative to positive and become larger in absolute value (-0.104, 0.102, and 0.669, 
respectively). This trend in self-section bias for high-school graduates contradicts the 
evidence of increasing self-selection inferred from the trend in selection bias for college 
graduates.  The negative selection bias for college graduates and positive selection bias 
for high-school graduates contradicts the hypothesis of single-factor (hierarchical) ability.  
College graduates do not appear to be better in everything than those who stop their 
schooling with high school graduation. Rather, it appears that in later years some high 
school graduates could not self-select into college despite the high potential return. The 
sorting gain for the unschooled group has been small and hardly significant (0.119, 0.033, 
and 0.060, respectively), similar to the pattern of sorting gain for college graduates.
36  
The above findings are consistent with the following unified explanation. Over 
the sample period, most college graduates are still college-worthy, but a growing number 
of college-worthy high school graduates have been denied the opportunity to attend 
                                                 
 
36 Our small estimates of sorting gain are not inconsistent with our estimates of selection bias.  Negative 
selection bias indicates that the agent's "ability" known to the agent but not known by the econometrician is 
below average in the schooling class not chosen.  But it does NOT imply that the agent receives above- 
average earnings in the chosen schooling class. Positive selection bias indicates that the agent is (would be) 
"above-average" among the members of schooling group not chosen.  In general the sign of sorting gain 
cannot be predicted from the sign of selection bias.   24
college. This explanation is consistent with the decline in sorting gains for both the 
schooled and unschooled groups.  We could say that the group of high school graduates 
has become increasingly “contaminated” by college-worthy students.  Aggregate data 
support this explanation.  Throughout our sample period, the college admission rate 
increased from only 3% in 1977 to nearly 40% in 2000, largely because of the expansion 
of college enrolment capacity. However, the tuition hikes that started in 1989 have 
caused financial difficulty for many families in funding college education. From 1990 to 
1998, the ratio of average tuition per student to per capita GDP increased from 1.54% to 
34% (Li, 2009).  
The heterogeneous return model postulates that those who attend college do so 
because they benefit more than those who choose not to attend, and thus the college 
choice is an endogenous response to such a benefit. It is consistent with someone 
choosing not to attend college because financial or psychic costs are expected to 
outweigh financial gains (Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil 2003). However, if all 
financial and psychic costs of college attendance are reflected in the propensity score, the 
model implies the MTE function is monotonically negatively sloped and represents a 
demand for college education in the sense that a decline in the marginal financial cost of 
college attendance is required to induce greater college attendance, cet. par.  Figure 3 
depicts the estimated MTE of college education from the benchmark specification of the 
earnings equation for the years 1988, 1995, and 2002. The MTE captures the observed 
gross financial gains from attending college, and it is in this sense that we identify those 
with high MTE as most “college-worthy”. The MTE curves for 1988 support the 
hypothesis that people with high gross financial returns are also more likely to attend 
college and those with smaller expected financial returns are less likely to attend college.  
However, the MTE curves become U-shaped in 1995 and 2002. This is consistent 
with the explanation given above, that only some college-worthy students are likely to 
attend college (as shown towards the left portion of the curve) while other college-worthy 
students are less likely to attend college (as shown towards the right portion of the curve). 
A U-shaped MTE is inconsistent with the joint hypothesis that agents’ unobserved 
heterogeneity involves only their comparative advantage to benefit from more schooling.    25
It is consistent with an unobserved barrier to college attendance in China, e.g. psychic 
costs or unobserved financial barriers (Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil 2004, p. 25).
37   
 
V. Conclusion   
 
In this study we investigate the returns to education during China’s economic 
transition, using a semi-parametric technique that is based on the assumptions of 
heterogeneous returns and that individuals act on the anticipated return. We estimated 
policy relevant parameters including the treatment effect on the treated, treatment effect 
on the untreated, and the average treatment effect, and discussed their dynamics for the 
period from 1988 to 2002.  
Although all three estimation methods — OLS, IV, and semi-parametric local IV 
(SPIV) — reveal a substantial increase in returns to schooling in China between 1988 and 
2002, they differ substantially in the estimated levels of returns.  We believe that only the 
SPIV estimates answer well-posed policy questions. Our results based on SPIV are quite 
robust for different specifications.  
We find that the increase in average treatment effect is driven by both an increase 
in the returns to those who have chosen college education, but also by a larger increase in 
the potential returns to those who remain “unschooled”.  Our estimates on selection bias 
indicate that while purposive selection has increased for college graduates, it has declined 
for high school graduates. In addition, sorting gain has become less pronounced for 
college graduates and remained small for high school graduates. We interpret these 
results as evidence indicating that while the higher education in China has increased 
reward for the schooled group, perhaps reflecting the rising influence of market forces, it 
has become less efficient in terms of financing college education among some college-
worthy youth.  
Our sample covers a period in which China’s higher education system underwent 
major structural changes. Higher costs of college education affect self-selection in two 
                                                 
 
37 When we add parental education as additional instrument, the results are quite robust.  Specifically, the 
changing pattern of MTE over time is strikingly similar. These results are not presented here but available 
upon request.   26
ways. Individuals (and their families) in the schooled group have responded to higher 
expected returns and have willingly paid the higher costs of choosing college.  On the 
other hand, among the unschooled group, we find evidence that individuals who would 
reap a return more than sufficient to compensate for the costs of college attendance have 
chosen not to go to college.   
This finding suggests that either the distaste for college education has increased 
over time, or that financial constraints on college attendance have become more severe.  
We believe that the second explanation is likely in light of the changes in education 
finance in China.  Thus, it seems to us that the movement toward higher tuition and 
private funding of higher education, while justified on many grounds, will also contribute 
to increasing income inequality in a vicious cycle. More specifically, those from wealthy 
families are more likely to reap the higher returns of education and then will become 
wealthier; however, those from poor families may be excluded from schooling 
opportunities and thus remain poor. Therefore, government policies that help individuals 
from financially-disadvantaged families gain access to higher education become crucial 
for equal opportunity to the benefits of reforms in China.  
Labor market reform is a critical component of the transition from planning to 
markets, and the old wage-grid and nomenklatura systems are rapidly being replaced by a 
market system that reflects the true value of education and allows individuals to make the 
schooling choices that they deem to be optimal. Since the economic reform started, two 
major changes in the China’s higher education system have been enrollment expansion 
and tuition hike. Based on our results, we find that increased opportunities for college 
education raised the benefits for those who attended college.  Yet, the increasing financial 
burden of college tuition hindered higher education for some college-worthy youth, and 
the lost gain associated with not attending college for this group has increased 
significantly as well.  The main policy implication of our results is that labor market and 
education system reform without accompanying capital market reform deprives the 
financially disadvantaged of the potential economic benefits.  27
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1.—Variable Definition 
Variable 1988  1995  2002 
Father Education (years)  Father's Education 
Mother Education (years) Mother's  Education 
Father's Salary in Earlier 
Years (1000 Yuan) 
Father's Annual Salary 
in 1988 
Father's Annual 
Salary in 1990 
Father's Annual 
Salary in 1998 
Mother's Salary in Earlier 
Years (1000 Yuan) 
Mother's Annual Salary 
in 1988 
Mother's Annual 
Salary in 1990 
Father's Annual 
Salary in 1998 
Number of Children  Number of Children living in the household 
Gender (male=1)  Gender dummy  
Ethnic  1 if the individual is an ethnic minority (non-Han Chinese) 
Work Experience (years) 
Estimated by age minus 
years of schooling 
minus 6
Year of Work Experience Reported 
Wage  Monthly Wage  Hourly Wage Rate 
Government Sector  Government or public 
institutions  Not available 
State-owned Sector  State-owned at central or provincial governmental level 
Local Publicly-owned Sector  Publicly-owned at lower government level 
Urban Collective Sector  Collectively Owned Sector 
Province  Dummy variables for each province 
Industry  Dummy variables for each industry 
Birth Year  Dummy variables for the year of birth 
College  1 if individual is a college graduate 
Note: wage includes regular wage, bonus, subsidies and other income from the work unit. 
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Table 2a.—Descriptive Statistics for 1988 Sample 
 
Full Sample  College Graduates High School 
Graduates 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev.
Father Education (years)  10.19  3.40  11.71  3.50  9.83  3.28 
Mother  Education  (years)  8.33 3.45 9.39 3.83 8.08 3.31 
Father Salary 1988  
(1000 Yuan)  2.12 1.31 2.30 1.56 2.08 1.24 
Mother Salary 1988  
(1000 Yuan)  1.22 1.06 1.39 1.08 1.19 1.06 
Number  of  Children  1.83 0.85 1.64 0.73 1.88 0.87 
Gender  (Male=1)  0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Ethnic  0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18 
Monthly Salary 
(1000 Yuan)  0.15 0.48 0.26 0.44 0.13 0.49 
Work Experience (years)  4.26  2.35  2.71  1.68  4.63  2.34 
State-owned  Sector  0.42 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.40 0.49 
Local Publicly-owned Sector  0.40  0.49  0.42  0.49  0.40  0.49 
Urban Collective Sector  0.17  0.37  0.06  0.24  0.19  0.39 
College 0.19  0.39  -  -  -  - 
Number of Observations  1128  216  912 
Note: the omitted ownership sector is non-public sector including private enterprises, Sino-
foreign joint venture, etc.   34
 
Table 2b.—Descriptive Statistics for 1995 Sample 
 




Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev. 
Father Education (years)  11.70  3.27  12.89  2.97  10.86  3.21 
Mother Education (years)  9.80  3.50  11.04  3.35  8.91  3.33 
Father Salary 1990  
(1000 Yuan)  3.55 2.13 3.76  2.49  3.41 1.83 
Mother Salary 1990  
(1000 Yuan)  2.58 1.55 2.87  1.77  2.38 1.34 
Number of Children  1.66  0.65  1.61  0.64  1.70  0.65 
Gender (male=1)  0.60  0.49  0.59  0.49  0.62  0.49 
Ethnic 0.04  0.19  0.04  0.19  0.03  0.18 
Hourly Wage (Yuan/hour)  2.30  1.84  2.69  2.21  2.02  1.46 
Work Experience (years)  5.55  3.77  5.02  3.55  5.94  3.87 
State-owned Sector  0.26  0.44  0.32  0.47  0.21  0.41 
Local Publicly-owned 
Sector  0.55 0.50 0.52  0.50  0.56 0.50 
Urban Collective Sector  0.10  0.31  0.06  0.24  0.13  0.34 
College  0.42  0.49 - - -  - 
Number of Observations  686  285  401 
Note:  the omitted ownership sector is non-public sector including private enterprises, Sino-
foreign joint venture, etc.   35
 
Table 2c.—Descriptive Statistics for 2002 Sample 
 




Variable  Mean Std.  Dev. Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Mean Std.  Dev.
Father Education (years)  10.57  3.22  11.23  3.25  9.53  2.89 
Mother Education (years)  9.54  3.06  10.04  2.94  8.75  3.08 
Father Salary 1998  
(1000 Yuan)  10.24 6.54 11.17  7.27 8.75  4.82 
Mother Salary 1998  
(1000 Yuan)  6.97 4.74 7.52  5.29  6.10 3.54 
Number of Children  1.26  0.46  1.27  0.47  1.24  0.45 
Gender (male=1)  0.61  0.49  0.54  0.50  0.71  0.45 
Ethnic 0.05  0.22  0.04  0.20  0.07  0.25 
Work Experience (years)  6.46  4.96  5.82  4.54  7.46  5.42 
Hourly Wage (Yuan/hour)  4.57  3.64  5.21  4.16  3.56  2.28 
Government Sector  0.30  0.46  0.42  0.49  0.11  0.31 
State-owned Sector  0.12  0.33  0.10  0.30  0.15  0.36 
Local Publicly-owned 
Sector  0.16 0.37 0.13  0.34  0.22 0.41 
Urban Collective Sector  0.06  0.24  0.03  0.18  0.11  0.31 
College 0.61  0.49  -  -  -  - 
Number of Observations  654  402  252 
Note: the omitted ownership sector is non-public sector including private enterprises, Sino-
foreign joint venture, share-holding company, etc. 
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Table 3a.—Propensity Estimates 
 
1988 
(based on current year parental income) 
1995 
(based on parental income in 1990) 
2002 
(based on parental income in 1998) 













Constant  -2.475 -10.043 0.000    -1. 804  -6.182  0.000    -1.847 -4.588 0.000   
Father Education  0.082 4.849 0.000 0.020  0.087 4.543 0.000 0.034  0.063 3.288 0.001 0.023 
Mother 
Education  0.002 0.132 0.448 0.001  0.074 4.030 0.000 0.029  0.057 2.784 0.003 0.021 
Father Salary  0.028 0.794 0.214 0.007  0.015 0.533 0.297 0.006  0.026 2.230 0.013 0.010 
Mother Salary  0.098 1.989 0.023 0.024  0.032 0.776 0.219 0.012  0.021 1.400 0.081 0.008 
Number of 
Children  -0.222 -3.664 0.000 -0.045  -0.098 -1.201 0.115 -0.037  0.023 0.191 0.424 0.009 
Gender  -0.087 -0.922 0.178 -0.020  -0.140 -1.297 0.098 -0.054  -0.539 -4.630 0.000 -0.195 
Ethnic  0.072 0.287 0.387 0.017  0.177 0.643 0.260 0.070  -0.295 -1.221 0.111 -0.114 
Number of 
Observations  1128 686 654 
Log Like.  -466.300 -407.807 -366.503 
Like. Ratio  0.154 0.124 0.159 
Pseudo-R2  0.316 0.510 0.690 
Notes:  The dependent variable is binary, which is 1 for graduated from 3- or 4-year college and 0 otherwise.  For 1995 and 2002, 
father’s and mother’s salary is for the time 5 years prior to the sample year; while for 1988, they are based on the current year income 
due to data limitation.  The results for birth year dummies are not reported.  The marginal effects are calculated using (mean+1) for 
easy interpretation, based on the sample average of each year.  For dummy variables, the marginal effects are calculated based on 
changing its value from 0 to 1.     37
Table 3b.—Marginal Effect Estimates 














Father  Education 0.010 0.034 0.024 
Mother Education  0.0002  0.029  0.021 
Father Salary  0.0047  0.022  0.040 
Mother  Salary  0.020 0.043 0.032 
Number of Children  -0.022  -0.037  0.009 
Gender -0.010  -0.054  -0.20 
Ethnic 0.009  0.069  -0.12 
Notes:  The marginal effects are evaluated at the overall 
sample mean (three years) for each variable.  It is calculated 
as (mean+1) in order to have a more meaningful 
interpretation.  For dummy variables, the marginal effect is 
calculated based on the difference between 0 and 1.  For birth 
year dummies, we use the 1968 cohort as the default.  The 
marginal effects for father and mother’s salary are measured 
by 1,000 Yuan increase in 1984 value based on the urban CPI 
index (1988, 157.2; 1995, 358.4; 2002, 396.3).   
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Table 4.—Comparison of Propensity Distributions 
 1988  1995  2002 
Sample size  1128  686  654 
Number of non-attenders  912  401  252 
Number of attenders  216  285  402 
Proportion of sample who are 







Cut-off Propensity  0.323  0.459  0.554 
Number of respondents in the “wrong” group   118  109  100 
Percentage of the non-attender group  12.94%  27.18%  39.68% 
Percentage of the attender group  54.63%  38.25%  24.88% 
Percentage of the total sample  10.46%  15.89%  15.29% 
Notes:  The cut-off propensity is the propensity score that corresponds to the 
cumulative frequency of the total sample that was attending or had graduated 
from college in the sample year.    39
Table 5:  Marginal Treatment Effect Estimates 
Parameter  CHIP88 CHIP95 CHIP02 
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Notes:  Dependent variable is monthly wage in 1988, hourly wage in 1995 and 2002. OLS regressors are a 
binary variable for college attendance, experience, experience squared, a dummy variable = 1 if male, a 
dummy variable = 1 if ethnicity not Han Chinese. The IV regression uses the propensity score as the 
instrument.  The treatment effect estimates are based on results from local polynomial regression. Standard 
errors shown in parentheses are obtained by bootstrapping, and a superscript “a” denotes statistical 
significance level of 0.01, “b” of 0.05, and “c” of 0.10. All coefficients represent the estimated return to 
four years of college.    40
 
 
Figure 1.—Heterogeneous Returns and Instrumental Variable Method 
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Figure 3.—Marginal Treatment Effects 
 
 
 